

83-1677
83-1678
No. 83-1679

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
MAY 11 1984
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS.
CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER, 1983 TERM

RICHARD F. CELESTE, GOVERNOR OF OHIO,
Appellant
v.
JUANITA C. BRANDON, et al.,
Appellees

On Appeal From The United States District Court
For The Southern District of Ohio

MOTION OF APPELLEES
GARY M. STARR, et al.,
TO AFFIRM

THOMAS R. FRUTIG
(*Counsel of Record*)
LIZABETH A. MOODY
GERALDINE H. URBANIC
1142 Hanna Building
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
(216) 781-1222

JEFFREY W. LARGENT
11925 Pearl Road
Strongsville, Ohio 44136

Attorneys For Appellees
GARY M. STARR, ET AL.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether appellants' contention that the test of good faith to be applied to efforts to obtain equality in a Congressional Reapportionment Plan is a subjective one which includes within it the idea of political compromise is so unsubstantial as to not need further argument.

2. Whether appellants' contention that the lower court had constitutionalized the Census Block as the unit of population measurement required to be used in Congressional apportionment is so unsubstantial as to not need further argument.

3. Whether appellants' failure to present any consistent justification, other than political expedience, for variations in population among the districts renders their contention that the trial court erred in interpreting the constitutional standard to require each variation to be justified as necessary in order to effectuate legitimate state policy, consistently applied, so unsubstantial as not to need further argument.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
QUESTIONS PRESENTED	i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES	iii
MOTION TO AFFIRM	i
REPORTED DECISIONS BELOW	2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION	2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE	2
 ARGUMENT:	
I. The District Court properly ruled that population deviations created by the redistricting plan adopted by the Ohio General Assembly were not unavoidable	7
II. The District Court was correct in considering the use of census blocks as evidence that these population variances were not unavoidable	10
III. The District Court was correct in holding that variances in population from district to district were not justified by legitimate state interest	11
CONCLUSION	14
APPENDIX	1a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	<u>PAGE</u>
CASES	
<i>Doulin v. White</i> , 528 Supp. 1323 (E.D. Ark. 1982) .	9
<i>Flanagan v. Gillmor</i> , 561 F. Supp. 36 (S. D. Ohio 1982)	2, 8
<i>Karcher v. Daggett</i> , U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983)	5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
<i>Kirpatrick v. Preisler</i> , 394 U.S. 526 (1968)	5, 7, 8, 9
<i>Latino Political Action Committee v. City of Boston</i> , 568 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Mass. 1983)	9
Other Provisions	
Article I, § 2, Constitution of the United States	2

83-1677
83-1678
No. 83-1679

Supreme Court of The United States
OCTOBER, 1983 TERM

— — — — —

RICHARD F. CELESTE, GOVERNOR OF OHIO
Appellant

v.

JUANITA C. BRANDON, et al.,
Appellees

— — — — —

**On Appeal From The United States District Court
For The Southern District of Ohio**

— — — — —

MOTION TO AFFIRM

— — — — —

Appellees Gary M. Starr, Raymond J. Wohl, Richard R. Mackay, James J. Modarelli, Beryl E. Rothschild, Jeffrey H. Freidman, M. David Fredman, Leonard Davis, Alan Rutsky, Leonard Vannice, Richard Damiani, Thomas Longo, respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Rule 16.1(c) to affirm the judgment of the three-judge United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on the ground that the questions on which the decision of the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to warrant further argument.

DECISIONS BELOW

This action was adjudicated below in two opinions. The first is reported as *Flanagan v. Gillmor* at 561 F. Supp. 36, and was rendered May 25, 1982. The second decision rendered January 30, 1984 (Appendix), is unreported.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

Article I, § 2 United States Constitution provides in relevant part:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As a result of the 1980 census, Ohio lost two of its seats in the United States House of Representatives, reducing its number of representatives from twenty-three to twenty-one.

It, therefore, was necessary to reapportion the State into two fewer Congressional Districts than existed previously. A redistricting bill (H.B. 20) was introduced into the Ohio House of Representatives on January 8, 1981. No further action was taken for over a year. Subsequently, on January 27, 1982, the Committee to which it had been referred reported out Amended Substitute House Bill 20, which was approved by the House on the same day. The House, at that time, was controlled by a Democratic party majority.

The Senate, controlled by a Republican party majority, thereafter, on February 17, 1982 passed a different version

of the act. Because of the differences in the House and Senate versions of the bill, it was referred to a Conference Committee, which on March 24, 1982, approved a compromise measure which the Governor signed into law on March 25, 1982. The bill, as enacted, was a midnight effort on the part of the Conference Committee in that the filing date for 1982 Congressional elections was March 24, 1982. The bill extended the deadline for such filings until April 5, 1982. On April 5, 1982, a further Bill (H.B. 953) correcting errors in H.B. 20 was enacted. The apportionment plan thus enacted is hereinafter sometimes referred to as the "Ohio Plan".

Prior to the passage of H.B. 20, on February 16, 1982, Patrick A. Flanagan, a Montgomery County resident, and Ann Butler, a Franklin County resident, filed a complaint on behalf of all citizens and electors of the State of Ohio who are qualified to vote for candidates for election to the United States House of Representatives alleging that the Ohio General Assembly had failed to enact a law creating the required 21 Congressional districts and requested the Court to establish a constitutional redistricting plan. On March 15, 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit designated a three judge panel to hear and determine the action.

On March 26, 1982, Juanita C. Brandon and Rose Marie Higenbottam, Franklin County residents, filed a motion to intervene in the action which was granted on April 6, 1982. The complaint in intervention alleged that the redistricting plan contained in H.B. 20 violated constitutional principles in that, contrary to the one-person-one-vote principle, the new districts unjustifiably deviated from the "ideal" population for Congressional districts; and in that certain of the new Congressional districts had been drawn so as to purposely dilute and deny the voting rights of Ohio's black citizens contrary to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

On April 14, 1982, a number of Cuyahoga County residents moved to intervene as defendants in the action. The Court also determined that this action should proceed on behalf of a class of citizens and electors of the State of Ohio who are qualified to vote for candidates for election to the United States House of Representatives.

Pursuant to a stipulation of dismissal filed on April 19, 1982, all defendants except the Governor and the Secretary of State were dismissed as defendants.

On March 26, 1982, Gary W. Starr, Raymond J. Wohl, Frank D. Castelli, and John Kavlich filed a complaint against the Governor and the Secretary of State of Ohio in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio alleging that the redistricting plan violated the one-person-one-vote principle required by the United States Constitution. They further claimed that the Plan created "crazy quilt U.S. Congressional districts in Cuyahoga County, Ohio," for the purpose of protecting the seats of two members of the House of Representatives from the Cuyahoga County area. Plaintiffs asserted that the new Congressional districts violated a claimed constitutional right to "unity of interest" and "convenience of access."

On April 2, 1982, an amended complaint was filed in the Northern District action adding as additional plaintiffs certain residents of Middleburg Heights and University Heights, Ohio. In addition to the allegations of the original complaint, the amended complaint alleged that the new Congressional districts fragmented existing political subdivisions through obvious political gerrymandering.

On April 9, 1982, a number of electors from the newly created 21st Congressional District moved to intervene as defendants in the Northern District action. In an order dated April 13, 1982, the three-judge District Court in the Northern District granted the motion to intervene as defendants and transferred the Northern District action to

the Southern District for the purpose of consolidation with the case pending in that district. The cases were consolidated and were tried on April 19-21, 1982.

At the trial it was agreed that the ideal size for each of the twenty-one Congressional Districts in Ohio is 514,173. This was based on the 1980 Census establishing 10,797,639 as the population of Ohio. In the Ohio Plan all Districts vary from the ideal, the largest deviation being 1,694 (District 1) and the smallest 16 (District 5). The maximum variation is 3,161 (between District 1 and District 7).

Evidence was presented that a plan could have been devised with a greater degree of mathematical accuracy than that contained in the Ohio Plan. According to witnesses, this could have been achieved in part by a more extensive use of census blocks, a smaller unit of measurement than the census tracts generally utilized in the plan.

In addition, there was testimony that with more time a better effort to achieve precise mathematical equality could have been made.

The evidence at trial further established that the Ohio Plan was primarily inspired by political (rather than mathematical or practical) considerations. Although the legislators who appeared as witnesses testified that they were generally aware of the one-man-one-vote rule, their political concerns were more immediate.

On May 25, 1982, the three-judge court, in an order and opinion filed May 25, 1982, reported at 561 F. Supp 36, concluded that the plaintiffs had "failed to prove that Ohio's black citizens were the victims of purposeful discrimination in the drawing of Congressional District lines" in the Ohio Plan, but held in abeyance, "the issue of whether the new plan is consistent with the *Kirkpatrick* 394 U.S. 526 (1968) requirement of precise mathematical equity" pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in *Karcher v. Daggett* 103 S.Ct. 2653 (1983).

At the same time, the court denied plaintiffs' request that it enjoin the use of the Ohio Plan districts for the 1982 election schedule using the Ohio Plan districts.

On January 30, 1984, the three-judge panel rendered an opinion holding that the Ohio Plan violated Article I, § 2 of the United States Constitution. In so holding the district court held that *Karcher v. Daggett* had established the following test for reviewing the constitutionality of Congressional redistricting plans:

First, the court must determine whether plaintiffs, opponents of the plan, have sustained their burden of proving population variances which could have been reduced or eliminated by a good faith effort. If, and only if, the plaintiff sustains this initial burden, must the Court move on to the second inquiry or level of analysis. At this stage, the state must bear the burden of proving that "each significant variance" was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal. (Appendix at 11a)

The court then held that opponents of a plan must meet their burden by showing that population variances among districts were not unavoidable and that the variances could have been reduced by a good faith effort. The court held the good faith, required by this rule, to be missing "when population variances can be reduced and those variances are not unavoidable." (Appendix at 14a). The court further held that equality not having been achieved the defendants had not justified the variances in the Plan. In its Order, the court required that a revised plan be presented to the court within forty-five (45) days.

In response to various motions filed by defendants on February 13, 1984, the court denied reconsideration and modified its earlier order to specify that the 1984 elections under the Plan were enjoined. The defendants thereafter

appealed to this court, after which the District Court stayed its order enjoining the 1984 elections under the Plan. As a result it is likely that Congressional elections in Ohio will be held for a second time under a Congressional Apportionment Plan which is unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT

Appellants contend that the District Court erred in holding the Ohio Plan unconstitutional on the basis of what the appellants believe is a misinterpretation of both the good faith and the justification standards set forth in *Karcher v. Daggett*, 103 S. Ct. 2653 (1983). Appellants also contend that the court has erroneously mandated the use of census blocks in Congressional redistricting as a constitutional requirement.

There can be no question from the record in this case, as set forth in the court's respective opinions below, that the population variances contained in the Ohio Plan were neither unavoidable nor justified. Nor is there any support for appellants' contention that the lower court has "constitutionalized" the use of census blocks in developing Congressional districts.

I. The District Court properly ruled that population deviations created by the redistricting plan adopted by the Ohio General Assembly were not unavoidable.

In *Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526 (1968), this Court interpreted Article I, § 2, of the United States Constitution as establishing a rule of mathematical equality in apportionment. The Court said:

Equal representation for equal numbers of people is a principle designed to prevent debasement of voting power and diminution of access to elected representatives. Toleration of even small deviations detracts from these purposes. Therefore, the command of

Art. I, § 2 that States create congressional districts which provide equal representation for equal numbers of people permits only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite good faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown. 394 U.S. at 531.

In *Karcher v. Daggett*, *supra* the Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation. It dispelled any belief that the standard established in *Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, *supra*, encompassed any *de minimis* exceptions. In *Karcher*, this Court set forth a two-part test to apply in each case, to wit: Those objecting to the plan must show that, "the population differences among districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good faith effort to draw districts of equal population." If the objectors can establish that such differences are, "not the result of a good faith effort to achieve equality, the state must bear the burden of proving that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal,". 103 S.Ct. at 2658.

The principal issue in this case is the interpretation of "good faith" used in the above test. Appellants contend that "good faith" in this context encompasses legislative compromise and requires only that the legislature shall have acted in "subjective good faith." They argued to the District Court and argue here again, that what is required is that those who challenge the plan must bear the burden of proving that the legislators acted in "bad faith". The District Court rejected this argument. In holding the Ohio Plan to be unconstitutional, the three-judge panel unanimously held that "good faith" is to be established by an objective test. The Court held: "When population variances can be reduced and variances are not unavoidable, then there is an absence of good faith in the special sense in which *Karcher* and *Kirkpatrick* used that phrase." *Flanagan v. Gillmor*, (Appendix at 14a).

Other lower courts interpreting the Supreme Court cases have also accepted the objective interpretation. See *Doulin v. White*, 528 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Ark. 1982) and *Latino Political Action Committee v. City of Boston*, 568 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Mass. 1983), application for stay pending appeal denied 716 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1983), application for stay pending petition for cert. denied sub nom. *Bellotti v. Latino Political Action Committee*, 104 S.Ct. 5 (1983).

The District Court correctly applied the test established in the *Karcher* and *Kirkpatrick* cases to the case at bar. The court's holding that the Ohio Plan countervenes Article I, § 2, of the United States Constitution is fully supported. Uncontroverted evidence in the record indicates that the legislature's failure to attain equality was based on the hurried manner in which the plan was adopted, the unit of measurement used and the dictates of political compromise. The trial court concluded:

... the difficulty arose in this case, as in many others, when the legislature tried to achieve population equality while concurrently pursuing secondary goals. Pursuit of secondary goals will often result in variances where such variances might otherwise not exist. That is precisely what appears to have happened in this case. (Appendix at 15a)

The record supports the Court's conclusion: all of the witnesses testified to the speed at which the Plan was conceived and the non-numerical considerations which dictated its final form. For example, Edith Woodward, an employee of the Legislative Service Commission, testified that in most cases her instructions concerned the number in a particular part of a district, not to hit the ideal number and that with more time she could have come closer to the ideal figure. Senator Meshel also testified that a plan could have been drawn much more closely aligned in equal population amounts.

Senator Gillmor testified that the Conference Committee could not have drawn a plan with less deviation that

would have passed the General Assembly and that the necessity for legislative compromise had an effect on efforts for absolute equality, and Senator Meshel evidenced his concern as to the procedures used and the methods used by the participants with too many clandestine meetings and not enough open meetings and participation by all parties involved. Other witnesses testified that no particular consideration was given to the issue of mathematical precision whatever.

The Court made it clear that it would have preferred a different result but that plaintiffs had in fact established that the variations among districts in the Ohio Plan were not unavoidable.

II. The District Court was correct in considering the use of census blocks as evidence that these population variances were not unavoidable.

Appellants contend that the Court in finding that greater equality might have been achieved by the use of census blocks has "constitutionalized the census block as the unit of population measurement required to be used in Congressional redistricting." This argument is specious. The court below correctly found that the legislature could have come closer to the ideal by a more extensive use of census blocks. It also could probably have come closer to the ideal had the Legislative Service Commission been furnished a computer instead of an adding machine. In so holding, it rejected appellants' arguments that the use of census tracts rather than census blocks dictated the variations in districts and were necessary in that smaller units of measurement are less reliable. This argument is no different from the argument rejected in *Karcher v. Daggett*, that a plan is, "*per se* a product of a good faith effort to achieve population equality because the maximum population deviation among districts is smaller than the predictable undercount in available census data." 103 S. Ct. at 2661.

The use of this evidence does not as a matter of logic dictate that census blocks and no other method may be used in order to obtain the required equality of population. The court simply held that the legislature must use whatever available measure was necessary to accomplish the desired end.

III. The District Court was correct in holding that variances in population from district to district were not justified by legitimate state interest.

It having concluded that the Redistricting Plan contained variances which were avoidable by a good faith effort to achieve population equality, the Court went on to apply the second level of inquiry with respect to justification of variances. The lower court interpreted the Supreme Court requirements as stated in *Karcher v. Daggett*, *supra*, to be:

The state must show (1) that a variation resulted from the legislature's attempt to carry out a legitimate state policy; (2) that the variation was necessary in order to effectuate the policy; and (3) that the policy was applied consistently throughout the state. (Appendix at 18a)

Appellants claimed justification for the Ohio Plan's failure to attain mathematical precision were alleged political fairness, preserving the constituencies of Ohio's only black representative and only woman representative, preserving communities of interest and political compromise. The lower court carefully reviewed each of these justifications. Although it conceded that such justifications other than "political compromise" could constitute a legitimate justification, in no case did it find that the State had carried its burden of proving that such justification was in fact the reason for the deviation, or that it was either necessary or consistently applied.

At the trial appellants made little attempt to justify the variances which had occurred in the Plan other than the claimed justification of preserving safe seats for Representatives Oakar and Stokes, all attempts at justification were in fact an application of hindsight. The appellants, moreover, concede that no justification was consistently applied from district to district.

Appellants, however, contend that the court's holding that each variance must be justified and that variances must be consistently maintained throughout, is not in keeping with the ruling in *Karcher, supra*. Appellants further maintain that if justification were needed there was a legitimate State interest behind each variance although not always the same legitimate interest.

The District Court was clearly correct in its application of the rules with respect to justification. The situation fits precisely the plain language of this Court in *Karcher v. Daggett* where it ruled:

The State must, however, show with some specificity that a particular objective required the specific deviations in its plan, rather than simply relying on general assertions. The showing required to justify population deviations is flexible, depending on the size of the deviations, the importance of the State's interests, the consistency with which the plan as a whole reflects those interests, and the availability of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those interests yet approximate population equality more closely. By necessity, whether deviations are justified required case-by-case attention to these factors.

The possibility that a State could justify small variations in the census-based population of its congressional districts on the basis of some legitimate, consistently applied policy was recognized in *Kirkpatrick* itself . . . We rejected its arguments not because those factors were impermissible considerations in the apportionment process, but rather because of the size of

the resulting deviations and *because Missouri* "[a]t best . . . made haphazard adjustments to a scheme based on total population," made "no attempt" to account for the same factors in all districts, and generally failed to document its findings thoroughly and apply them "throughout the State in a systematic, not an *ad hoc* manner." . . .

At argument before the District Court and on appeal in this Court, appellants emphasized only one justification for the Feldman Plan's population deviations — preserving the voting strength of racial minority groups. . . .

Nowhere do appellants suggest that the large population of the Fourth District was necessary to preserve minority voting strength; in fact, the deviation between the Fourth District and other districts has the effect of diluting the votes of all residents of that district, including members of racial minorities, as compared with other districts with fewer minority voters. The record is completely silent on the relationship between preserving minority voting strength and the small populations of the Third and Sixth Districts. Therefore, the District Court's findings easily pass the "clearly erroneous" test. 103 S. Ct. at 2663-2664. (emphasis supplied).

This Court made it clear that the State must be able to show that each variance is justifiable on a consistent basis. The three-judge court adopted that rule and applied it correctly.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted

THOMAS R. FRUTIG
(Counsel of Record)

LIZABETH A. MOODY
GERALDINE H. URBANIC
1142 Hanna Building
Cleveland, Ohio 44118
(216) 781-1222

JEFFREY LARGENT
11925 Pearl Road
Strongsville, Ohio 44136

Attorneys for Appellees

GARY M. STARR, et al.

Dated: May 11, 1984

APPENDIX

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Patrick A. Flanagan, et al.,	}	Case No. C-2-82-173
Plaintiffs		
v.		
Paul E. Gillmor, et al.,		
Defendants		

Gary M. Starr, et al,	}	Case No. C-2-82-394
Plaintiffs		
v.		
James A. Rhodes, Governor, State of Ohio, et al.,		
Defendants		

ORDER

(Filed January 30, 1984)

In accordance with an opinion simultaneously filed herein and for the reasons therein stated, the Court concludes that plaintiffs have sustained their burden of proving that the Ohio Plan does not meet the "equal representation" standard of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States. A revised plan for Congressional redistricting which satisfies the requirement of Article

I, § 2 should be forwarded to this Court for review within forty-five (45) days of the date of this order.

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

/s/ NATHANIEL R. JONES,
Circuit Judge

/s/ JOSEPH P. KINNEARY,
District Judge

/s/ ROBERT M. DUNCAN,
District Judge

January 30, 1984

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION

<p>Patrick A. Flanagan, et al., Plaintiffs</p>	}	Case No. C-2-82-173
v.		
<p>Paul E. Gillmor, et al., Defendants</p>	}	
<p>Gary M. Starr, et al., Plaintiffs</p>	}	Case No. C-2-82-394
v.		
<p>James A. Rhodes, Governor, State of Ohio, et al., Defendants</p>	}	

OPINION

(Filed January 30, 1984)

Before Nathaniel R. Jones, Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; Joseph P. Kinneary, United States District Judge; and Robert M. Duncan, United States District Judge.

Duncan, District Judge. This is our second occasion to judicially review the State of Ohio's Congressional redistricting plan (Ohio Plan) which effectively became law on March 25, 1982.¹ By an order dated May 25, 1982, we

¹ In 1981 a Congressional redistricting plan, House Bill 20, was introduced in the Ohio House of Representatives. After the House passed the bill on January 27, 1982, the Senate passed an amended version on February 17, 1982. At that time the legislature was facing a statutory time deadline of March 24, 1982, when petitions of candidacy for Congress had to be filed. A compromise was reached by a Conference Committee; the compromise bill was enacted and signed into law by the Governor on March 25, 1982. The enactment contained a provision postponing the petition-filing deadline until April 5, 1982. Subsequently, because of a number of errors in H.B. 20, a corrective measure, H.B. 953, was enacted and became effective April 5, 1982.

decided not to enjoin use of the plan for the upcoming Congressional election and stated that:

We accordingly will hold in abeyance the issue of whether the Ohio plan satisfies the mathematical precision of *Kirkpatrick, supra* [*Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526, 533-34 (1969)] until we have the benefit of the Supreme Court's decision in the New Jersey case.

Flanagan v. Gillmor, 561 F. Supp. 36, 50 (S.D. Ohio, E.D. 1982).

On June 22, 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case *Karcher, Speaker, New Jersey Assembly, et al. v. Daggett, et al.*, — U.S. —, 51 U.S.L.W. 4953 (1983). The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a congressional reapportionment plan enacted by the New Jersey Legislature after the 1980 census.

After receiving certain additional 1980 census material, reading counsels' memoranda, hearing argument, and carefully considering the Ohio Plan in light of the precedential congressional redistricting requirements set forth in the *Karcher* case, we determine that the Ohio Plan fails to meet the "equal representation" standard of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

I

The facts of the case essentially remain unchanged from those set forth in *Flanagan, supra*. Rather than repeat them herein, a historical summary will do.

The Parties

Case No. C-2-82-173 was filed February 16, 1982, in this Court as a class action by named plaintiffs Patrick A. Flanagan and Ann Butler. They claimed that the Ohio General Assembly had failed to enact a congressional

redistricting plan and requested the Court to establish a plan. Meanwhile the Ohio Plan was adopted. Those named plaintiffs now argue that the Ohio Plan is constitutional. (See Brief of Plaintiffs Patrick A. Flanagan and Ann Butler in Support of Present Ohio Congressional Redistricting Plan.)

Next in March 1982, Juanita C. Brandon and Rose Marie Higenbottam moved to intervene in Case No. C-2-82-173 in a styled class action attacking the constitutionality of the plan. They vigorously continue the attack.

A number of Cuyahoga County residents were granted intervention as defendants. They support the lawfulness of the plan.

Gary W. Starr, Raymond J. Wohl, Frank D. Castelli, and John Kavlich filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio seeking to have the plan declared unconstitutional (Case No. C-2-83-394). That complaint was amended and additional plaintiffs were added. A number of electors of the 21st Congressional District intervened as party defendants. The case was transferred to this District and consolidated with Case No. C-2-82-173. The *Starr* plaintiffs and defendants have not altered their positions concerning the constitutionality of the Ohio Plan.

The defendants in both cases are the current Governor and Secretary of the State of Ohio.

In the discussion hereinafter, plaintiff-intervenors in the *Flanagan* case and plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenors in the *Starr* case will be referred to as plaintiffs. Defendants and defendant-intervenors in both cases will be called defendants.

The Ohio Plan

According to the 1980 census, the Ohio population is 10,797,630. The ideal population for each of Ohio's 21 Congressional districts is 514,193. All districts deviate from this ideal number. The average deviation from the ideal is .14%. Six districts have a percentage deviation of .20% or more; fifteen districts have a percentage deviation of .10% or more. District 1 has a population of 515,863, which is 1,694 above the ideal or +.33%. District 7 has a population of 512,706, 1,467 below the ideal or —.29%. The range of deviation between the two districts is .62%, referred to as the total percentage deviation.²

The General Assembly had other plans before it. None of them had a lower total percentage deviation, but two of them were better than the final plan regarding average percentage deviation. Earlier this Court concluded that "the plan as enacted compares favorably to the other proposed plans. *Flanagan, supra*, p. 42.

Deviations from the Ideal

At the time of the enactment of the Ohio Plan, the Ohio House of Representatives was controlled by a majority of Democrats, while the Senate was controlled by a

² Certain factual similarities between the New Jersey case and the Ohio case are undeniable. In the New Jersey case, following the 1980 census, New Jersey lost one seat in the House of Representatives. After two unsuccessful attempts at redistricting, the legislature for the State of New Jersey convened and "swiftly" passed a bill introduced by Senator Feldman, president pro tem of the State Senate. Under the Feldman Plan, as the New Jersey plan came to be known, the average variance among districts was .1384% or about 726 people. Under the Ohio Plan, which was also drafted after the 1980 census, the average variance among districts was .14%. In the New Jersey Plan, the variation between the most and least populous districts was .6984% or 3,674 people. In the Ohio Plan, the population difference between the largest and smallest districts was 3,161, i.e., a maximum variation of .62%.

majority of Republicans. Obviously, a bipartisan accord was necessary to pass the legislation.

Senate Majority Leader Gillmor, Speaker of the House Riffe, and Representative Stinziano all testified, in essence, of their awareness of and sensitivity to a requirement that the districts be balanced in population and as close to the ideal number as possible.³ However, Senator Meshel, Senate Minority Leader, testified that a plan could have been drawn "a lot more closely aligned in equal population." (Meshel Tr. 7-9.)

Edith Woodward, an employee of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, worked on the preparation of the redistricting plan. She stated that her effort was to plan each district to have a population of 514,173 or as close to that figure as practicable. She was not told by any member of the General Assembly that there was any permissible fixed deviation. However, as we stated in our earlier opinion, Ms. Woodward admitted that with more time a better effort to achieve precise mathematical equality could have been made. *Flanagan, supra*, p. 42.

For the most part larger unit census tracts rather than smaller census blocks were used in preparation of the plan. Use of census blocks could have reduced the extent of a number of variances from the ideal.

³ For example, Senator Gillmor testified: (Gillmor Tr. 4)

Q. Did you understand that the only variances from the mathematical equality of zero deviation are these that are unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality or for which justification is shown?

A. It was our feeling that we had to get down to zero if it were possible, yes.

However, Gillmor also stated: (Gillmor Tr. 4)

Q. I take it then that your answer is yes, the necessity for legislative compromise did have an effect on efforts to achieve absolute equality among the districts. Is that correct?

A. I suppose it may have.

The Ohio General Assembly's efforts to achieve mathematical parity were effected by a number of influences. The omnipresent reality of political compromise surely had a causal relationship to the result. The legislature, in enacting the plan, made efforts to "preserve the core of existing Congressional districts, to achieve relative geographical compactness, and to preserve the political complexion of the districts of incumbent members of the Congressional delegation." *Flanagan, supra*, p. 42. The Ohio Plan was also designed to maintain favorable district constituencies for Representative Louis Stokes, Ohio's only black member of Congress, and Representative Rose Oakar, the only woman member of Congress from Ohio.

In our earlier opinion we found that the legislature could have attained greater precision, and that the variances from the numerical ideal were not shown to be unavoidable. *Flanagan, supra*, p. 47.

Race-Religion

Plaintiff-intervenors contended that the Ohio Plan was purposely designed to dilute the voting strength of Ohio's black citizens. The evidence focused on the black populations in Franklin, Hamilton and Cuyahoga Counties. The May 25, 1982 opinion thoroughly discusses this issue. *Flanagan, supra*, pp. 42-46. In sum, we determined that the evidence fails to establish an invidiously discriminatory racial motive accounting in whole or in part for the districts' boundaries. We previously had occasion to note that if the General Assembly, in enacting a redistricting plan, uses racial demography as a factor in considering the political complexion of a district, and the result is a significant diminution of black voting power, we would be concerned about the lawfulness of such a plan. Under such circumstances a permissible inference of purposeful discrimination could be drawn. See *Flanagan, supra*, n.20.

Finally, we earlier decided that there were insufficient proofs that in dividing the 19th from the 21st District in part between the two census tracts which together include University Heights, the General Assembly was animated by a purpose to dilute the ability of voters to organize along religious or racial lines. *Flenagan, supra*, p. 46.

II

As this Court noted in its prior opinion and as the Supreme Court noted in *Karcher*, Article I, § 2 establishes a high standard of "justice and common sense" for the apportionment of congressional districts: "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's." *Wesberry v. Sanders*, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (footnote omitted). This principle of "equal representation" was defined with greater specificity in the seminal case of *Kirkpatrick v. Preisler*, 394 U.S. 526 (1969) when the Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to a Missouri redistricting plan.

In finding the deviations in *Kirkpatrick* unacceptable, the Supreme Court noted that

[T]he "as nearly as practicable" standard requires that the state make a good faith effort to achieve precise mathematical equality

Unless population variances among congressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such effort, the state must justify each variance, no matter how small.

Kirkpatrick, supra, pp. 530-31.

Therefore, under the rule enunciated in *Kirkpatrick*, "only the limited population variances which are unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for which justification is shown" are permissible. *Id.* at 531.

Since the Supreme Court's decision in *Kirkpatrick*, the need to satisfy the mandate of Article I, § 2 for mathematical equality among districts has engendered additional

litigation. Without engaging in an exhaustive analysis of all the precedents concerning reapportionment of congressional districts, the Court notes that the most recent plurality decision of the Supreme Court in *Karcher v. Daggett* provides this Court with additional guidance on this question.⁴ In *Karcher*, the Supreme Court set forth the analysis which must be engaged in by a court reviewing the constitutionality of a dedistricting plan.

First, the court must consider whether population differences among districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good faith effort to draw districts of equal population. Parties challenging apportionment legislation must bear the burden of proof on this issue, and if they fail to show that the differences could have been avoided the apportionment scheme must be upheld. If, however, the plaintiffs can establish that the population differences were not the result of a good faith effort to achieve equality the state must bear the burden of proving that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal.

Karcher, supra, p. —.

⁴ This Court has already indicated that there are a number of similarities between the Ohio and the New Jersey Plans. Despite these similarities, the proponents of the Ohio Plan argue that there are dissimilarities between the two cases that allow the Ohio Plan to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Specifically, defendants in this case argue that unlike the New Jersey case, where the legislature had a plan with lower deviations to choose from, the Ohio legislature in this case chose the plan with the lowest deviation. While it is true that the Supreme Court in *Karcher* mentions the fact that the New Jersey legislature had before it other plans with smaller deviations, that fact was one fact among many which led the court to conclude that the deviations were not unavoidable; it was not conclusive. Therefore, the fact that there were no other plans under consideration by the Ohio legislature which contained significantly lower deviations does not mean that the plan that was adopted contained deviations which were unavoidable.

As is evident from the above-quoted language, *Karcher* mandates that courts engaged in a constitutional review of congressional redistricting plans employ a two-part analysis. First, the court must determine whether plaintiffs, opponents of the plan, have sustained their burden of proving population variances which could have been reduced or eliminated by a good faith effort. If, and only if, the plaintiff sustains this initial burden, must the Court move on to the second inquiry or level of analysis. At this stage, the state must bear the burden of proving that "each significant variance" was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal. *Id.* For the sake of clarity, the Court will attempt to elucidate what is required under each prong of *Karcher's* two-part analysis.

A. Good Faith

The first prong of the *Karcher* test requires this Court to make a determination as to whether "the population differences among districts could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population." *Karcher, supra*, p.

In determining what evidence satisfies this first prong of the *Karcher* analysis, this Court has struggled with the "good faith" language of *Karcher* and *Kirkpatrick*. The opponents of the Ohio Plan contend that plaintiffs meet their burden by showing that population variances among districts were not unavoidable and that the variances could have been reduced or eliminated altogether by a good faith effort. Conversely, proponents of the Ohio Plan argue that persons challenging the plan bear the burden of showing that the defendant acted without good faith or with some bad or invidious motive. This Court believes that the opponents of the plan have correctly analyzed *Kirkpatrick* and its progeny.

It is true that at first blush the standard for judging the constitutionality of redistricting plans under Article I, § 2 appears exacting, even harsh for those attempting to draft constitutionally sound redistricting plans. Nonetheless, it would seem that at least with respect to the first prong of the *Karcher-Kirkpatrick* test numerical considerations, *i.e.*, mathematical equality, are of primary significance.

The primary importance of mathematical considerations in congressional redistricting⁵ is apparent when one reads the line of cases concerning apportionment in state legislative districts. In explaining the distinction between apportionment of congressional as opposed to state legislative districts, the Supreme Court has had occasion to note that

Thus, whereas population alone has been the sole criterion of constitutionality in congressional redistricting under Art. I, § 2, broader latitude has been afforded states under the equal protection clause in state legislative redistricting.

Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973). Accord *Gaffney v. Cumming*, 412 U.S. 735 (1973).

In *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. 783, 792 (1973), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the distinction between challenges to congressional districts and challenges to state districts. Interestingly enough, the defendants in *Weiser* also argued that absent proof of invidiousness, population variances did not violate Article I, § 2. The Court rejected

⁵ The primary significance of mathematical equality was apparent even before the Supreme Court decided *Karcher* as is evident by the discussion which follows. See pp. 11-13. *infra*. Moreover, this Court in its prior opinion acknowledged the primary importance of numerical considerations when it noted that under *Kirkpatrick* a finding that a variance is not unavoidable disposed of the issue of good faith. See *Flanagan, supra*, p. 47.

this argument and "reiterated that the *Wesberry*, *Kirkpatrick* and *Wells* line of cases would continue to govern congressional reapportionments, although holding that the *rigor of the rule* of those cases was inappropriate for state reapportionments." *Weiser*, *supra*, p. 793.

This Court believes that support for the exacting definition of "good faith" may initially be found by contrasting the analysis used in those cases challenging state districts with the more stringent analysis used in cases involving congressional districts.

As has already been noted, the proponents of Ohio's plan seem to maintain that the numerical strictures of *Kirkpatrick* and *Karcher* can be avoided in this case because there is evidence that the legislature acted in subjective good faith. In support of their contention, proponents argue that a number of legislative leaders testified unequivocally that the plan in question was in their opinion a reasonable legislative compromise and that efforts were made to achieve population equality. More specifically, the proponents of the Ohio Plan, in support of their subjective good faith argument, contend that the New Jersey Plan, held to be unlawful by the Supreme Court in *Karcher*, is in some significant respects dissimilar to the Ohio Plan. There is no evidence that the Ohio General Assembly enacted the plan on the premise that a deviation lower than the statistical imprecision of the decennial census was the "functional equivalent of mathematical equality" as the District Court found in *Daggett v. Kimmelman*, 535 F. Supp. 978, 982-983 (N.J. 1982).

Nothing in the Court's decision here today is meant to suggest that the Ohio legislature acted with invidious motives. The Court has no reason to doubt that the legislature conducted itself in good faith insofar as it strove to obtain an acceptable political solution to a thorny legal and political problem. Clearly, that solution was a compromise with

which no one was completely enamoured but which dissatisfied the fewest number of people. However, the absence of evidence of the subjective bad intentions of individual legislators is irrelevant. Such evidence is not required to sustain the burden of proof set forth in the first prong of *Karcher*.

The Court concedes that were the question of "good faith" capable of resolution by use of a standard less exacting than that set forth in *Karcher* and *Kirkpatrick*, we would arguably have a closer case. However, this Court concludes, and is not alone in doing so, that good faith as that term is used in *Karcher* and *Kirkpatrick* is tantamount to a term of art having a special meaning. See *Doulin v. White*, 528 F. Supp. 1323, 1328-29 (E.D. Ark. 1982).⁶ Stated rather simply, when population variances can be reduced and those variances are not unavoidable, then there is an absence of good faith in the special sense in which *Karcher* and *Kirkpatrick* use that phrase.

⁶ In *Doulin* the court sincerely rejected attempts by proponents of Arkansas' redistricting plan to persuade the court that good faith means subjective good faith. This Court finds the reasoning of that court persuasive.

It is possible to argue, of course, that if the plaintiffs' burden is limited to showing "variances which can be reduced and which are not unavoidable" then the term "good faith" is rendered meaningless. This Court believes that the definition of good faith herein adopted is entirely consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in *Karcher*. While the conclusion that the term good faith is in essence synonymous with proof that population variances could have been reduced and were not unavoidable may render the words "good faith" surplusage, this conclusion does not render the term "good faith" meaningless. Rather it results in a greater specificity of meaning for that term. In this regard it can no longer be the subject of dispute that "at some point . . . , population variances do import invidious devaluation of an individual's vote" *White v. Weiser*, 412 U.S. 783, 792 (1973). This language seems to buttress this Court's conclusion regarding the "good faith" language in the line of cases beginning with *Kirkpatrick* and ending with *Karcher*.

In the case at bar, opponents of the Ohio Plan sagely note that this Court has already concluded that greater precision was possible than that which was achieved by the Ohio Plan. *Flanagan, supra*, p. 47. More specifically, this Court concluded that "the variances were not shown to be unavoidable." *Id.* The court went on to note that this failure to achieve mathematical equality could be attributed to a number of factors including the process of legislative compromise, the unit of measurement used,⁷ and the hurried manner in which the plan was adopted. *Id.* at 42.

This Court concluded in its prior opinion and today reaffirms the conclusion that had the legislature exercised the kind of good faith effort to achieve population equality required by the Supreme Court, it would have been able to come significantly closer to that goal than it did. While this Court has no doubt that the legislature was trying to do something in good faith, achieving population equality was not the sole focus of legislative efforts. More specifically, the difficulty arose in this case, as in many others, when the legislature tried to achieve population equality while concurrently pursuing secondary goals. Pursuit of secondary goals will often result in variances where such variances might otherwise not exist. That is precisely what appears to have happened in this case. Specifically, Witness Tilling testified as follows:

⁷ This Court concluded in its original opinion that "census tracts are the larger unit of measurement and census blocks are the smaller. By utilizing census blocks, a greater degree of mathematical precision was possible." *Flanagan, supra*, p. 42. While it is true that the Court also concluded that "[t]he evidence at trial was inconclusive on the issue of whether greater precision could have been obtained solely by reallocation of census tracts . . ." *Id.*, at 42, n.5, the failure to make more frequent use of the smaller unit of measure was one factor which led to the Court's conclusion that the variances were not unavoidable.

- Q. Would it have been possible to draw 21 congressional districts with exactly 514,173 people in each of them, using the data that you had available?
- A. Not without seriously disrupting the communities of interest which you have asked me about before. They would be decimated by such a process.
- Q. But it would have been possible by ignoring that? Is that your testimony?
- A. Basically, I guess I am saying that you can do one or the other.
- Q. Then it would also have been possible to draw a plan that varied by less than 3100 people among the districts, wouldn't it?
- A. Yes, again, if you are willing to disregard communities of interest and census tract boundaries, you could, indeed, do that.

(Tilling Tr. 127-128.) This testimony suggests that mathematical equality was sacrificed for the pursuit of secondary goals. While the Supreme Court has conceded that there may be permissible variances, such variances must be shown by the defendants to be the result of the pursuit of some legitimate goal or policy. Defendants have failed to make the requisite showing in this case. Moreover, this showing is irrelevant to whether the good faith standard of *Karcher* has been satisfied.

Before moving on to an analysis of the secondary goals proffered as basis or justification for population variances in this case, one final related matter deserves to be addressed. The proponents of the Ohio Plan argue that drafters of a redistricting plan may still be held to have acted in good faith even though they pursued secondary political goals. This argument is little more than a restatement of prior arguments. That is, the proponents appear to be arguing that the burden should not shift to them even though there

are "not unavoidable variances" which resulted from the pursuit of legitimate secondary goals provided they are found to have acted in subjective good faith. This argument is rejected by this Court.

Moreover, the Court believes the defendants misconstrue the relevance of the pursuit of secondary non-numerical goals to the question of whether the plaintiffs have met their burden under the first "good faith" prong of the *Karcher* test. The pursuit of secondary non-numerical goals is irrelevant to the first prong "good faith" inquiry as that inquiry has been defined at length in the preceding pages. Generally, consideration of such goals only becomes relevant after the issue of good faith has been resolved and the burden has shifted to the state to justify — not unavoidable variances." The language of *Karcher* supports this conclusion.

We have never denied that apportionment is a political process, or that state legislatures could pursue legitimate secondary objectives Nevertheless the claim that political considerations require population differences among congressional districts belongs more properly to the second level of judicial inquiry in these cases

Karcher, supra, p.

In this same vein, in considering the legitimacy of the particular secondary goal of preserving political subdivisions, the *Karcher* court noted that "while perfectly permissible as a secondary goal, [pursuit of that political goal] is not a sufficient excuse for failing to achieve population equality without the specific showing described *infra*" *Karcher, supra*, p. , n.5.

Therefore, while the pursuit of secondary objectives is certainly permissible after *Karcher*, the presence or absence of such goals does little to militate in favor of finding

good faith where the Court has found variances which are not unavoidable. Secondary goals must remain secondary; the primary goal must be equality. The pursuit of legitimate goals may be proffered as justification for "not unavoidable variances," however. In that regard, proof of the pursuit of secondary non-numerical goals is more properly considered as part of the state's proof after the burden has shifted.

B. Legitimate Secondary Goals

Upon a determination that a state legislature did not formulate a congressional redistricting plan containing only those variances which were unavoidable despite a good faith effort to achieve population equality, the burden shifts to the state to justify each significant variance. The state must show that a specific deviation from the ideal is necessary in order to achieve a legitimate state policy goal and that the policy is applied consistently throughout the plan. This second level of inquiry requires a three-part analysis with respect to each district which significantly deviates from the ideal. The state must show (1) that a variation resulted from the legislature's attempt to carry out a legitimate state policy; (2) that the variation was necessary in order to effectuate the policy; and (3) that the policy was applied consistently throughout the state.

There is language in *Karcher* to the effect that "the state must bear the burden of proving that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal." *Karcher, supra*, p. . The Court does not indicate what is meant by a "significant variance."

Karcher's recent language is somewhat different from the language previously used by the Supreme Court in *Kirkpatrick*. In *Kirkpatrick* the Supreme Court stated that "the state must justify each variance, no matter how small." *Kirkpatrick, supra*, pp. 530-31. *Karcher*, on the other hand, requires the state to bear the burden of justifying "each significant variance." *Karcher, supra*, at .

After giving this matter careful consideration, we interpret the language of *Karcher* as follows: In determining whether a variance is significant, the court must consider the total plan, the range of the variances from the ideal, and the nature of the goal or goals of the legislature.

This Court's interpretation of significant, as that term is used in *Karcher*, is supported by the following language from that opinion:

The showing required to justify population deviations is flexible, depending on the size of the deviations, the importance of the state's interest, the consistency with which the plan as a whole reflects those interests, and the availability of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those interests yet approximate population equality more closely.

Karcher, supra, p.

Given the arguable uncertainty surrounding the meaning of the term "significant variance," and in order to adhere to the true spirit of *Karcher*, the state would be well-advised to be prepared to set forth a basis for each variance.

The Supreme Court has acknowledged that a state may have any number of legitimate concerns which will serve to justify small variances in a redistricting scheme. A state's interest in making districts compact, in respecting municipal boundaries, in preserving cores of prior districts and in avoiding contests between incumbent representatives, have been set forth in *Karcher* as legislative policies which, if applied consistently, and in a non-discriminatory manner, could justify population deviations. *Karcher, supra*, p.

⁸ The court in *Karcher* also noted that some of the policies presented by Missouri in *Kirkpatrick*, which are not presented in this

1. Preserving Minority Voting Strength

Preservation of minority voting strength is another example of a permissible state policy which may justify variances from the ideal. A state's desire to preserve existing minority voting strength is the logical outgrowth of the prohibition against the dilution of that voting strength. The Court has held it constitutionally impermissible to draw congressional districts in a manner which purposely dilutes the voting strength of an identifiable minority. The decision to preserve existing minority voting strength has not been specifically ruled on in the context of a challenge based upon a failure to reach population equality.

In *Karcher*, however, the Supreme Court indicated that the legislative policy of preserving minority voting strength against the potential of dilution provides a legitimate justification for a population deviation, where a "causal relationship" exists between that policy and the deviation. The District Court, in that case, found no such "causal relationship between the goal of preserving minority voting strength . . . and the population variances." *Daggert v. Kimmelman*, 535 F. Supp. 978 (D. N.J. 1982). Observing that the record was "completely silent" on that relationship, the Supreme Court concluded that the District Court's findings were not "clearly erroneous." In so

case, could be legitimate justifications for variances. District-to-district differences in the number of eligible voters, or projected population shift, may in some instances stand.

We rejected [Missouri's] arguments not because these factors were impermissible considerations in the apportionment process, but rather because of the size of the resulting deviation and because Missouri '[a]t best made . . . haphazard adjustments to a scheme based on total population,' made 'no attempt' to account for the same factors in all districts and generally failed to document its findings thoroughly and apply them 'throughout the state in a systematic, not an ad hoc manner.'

Karcher, supra, p. ——— (citations and footnote omitted.)

concluding, however, the Supreme Court suggested that the policy of preserving minority voting strength itself is a legitimate one. That policy therefore provides a legitimate justification for a deviation where the facts indicate that it is causally related to the deviation.

The legitimacy of the preservation of minority voting strength, moreover, has been addressed in connection with the congressional reapportionment of districts subject to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In *United Jewish Organizations v. Carey*, 430 U.S. 144 (1976), the Court addressed the issue whether racial considerations could be intentionally used in an affirmative manner when reapportioning congressional districts. The Court held that racial criteria may be used in redistricting plans in order to maintain non-white voting strength. *Carey*, *supra*, at 165-168.

If a state may explicitly use racial criteria in drawing districts in a manner which will maintain the minority voting strength of a community, then, as *Karcher* indicates, it follows that the state may also draw districts in a manner which will preserve minority voting strength where it already exists.

While the state in this case did not attempt to justify the Ohio Plan by arguing the preservation of minority voting strength, the state did claim to justify certain variances on the grounds that it was creating "safe" districts for Ohio's only black Representative and Ohio's only woman Representative. The preservation of safe congressional districts for Representatives Stokes and Oakar in the 21st and 20th districts, respectively, is not only an outgrowth of a policy seeking to preserve minority (protected class) voting strength, but also of an analogous policy of preserving minority representation. Having such representation is important to Ohio's delegation in the Congress. Therefore, the state's goal of preserving safe districts for Representatives Stokes and Oakar is permissible as a justification for necessary small deviations in district population.

Although such a goal is legitimate, the burden remains with the state to show with particularity that certain deviations in the plan were necessary to achieve that goal, and that that goal was applied in a consistent manner throughout the state. There is no evidence before the Court which states, other than in general and conclusory terms, that the only way the state could have achieved the goal in question was to have the variances that appear in this plan.

The Court hastens to add that if upon further consideration of this plan the General Assembly is persuaded, and the state can demonstrate to this Court, that small deviations in connection with this legitimate goal are necessary, then such deviations would certainly comport with the standards of *Karcher*.

2. Political Fairness

Defendants strongly urge upon this Court other justifications for the variances found in the Ohio Plan. Specifically, proponents of the plan argue that to some extent, the population variances were caused by a legislative intent to be politically fair. Generally speaking, it is hard to quarrel with the legitimacy of such a goal. Certainly insofar as this goal reflects a legislative intent to prevent gerrymandering, it is legitimate. *Karcher, supra*, p. n.6. Before the Court may accept this goal as a legitimate justification for variances, however, the state must relate with particularity how each variance furthers such a goal, *i.e.*, the necessity requirement of *Karcher*. The state must further sustain the burden of demonstrating consistent application of the concept of political fairness.

Once again, the record in this case reveals that the state has merely asserted in a general way that political fairness justified the variances present in the Ohio Plan. Stated another way, the state has failed to carry its burden under the second prong of the *Karcher* analysis.

3. Political Compromise

This Court is well aware that the Ohio Plan was enacted only after a political stalemate between the parties had been resolved by a dedicated conference committee. Apart from their contention that the Ohio Plan is politically fair, proponents of Ohio's plan appear to be arguing that in order to pass the Ohio Plan, political compromises or concessions from both political parties were necessary. Proponents seem to further argue that the variances in this case can be explained and justified under *Karcher* because the Ohio Plan was the result of such a compromise.

The Court concludes that the political compromise which occurred in this case was not a prospective goal but rather was a retrospective realization of what happened. While political fairness may be a legitimate goal under *Karcher*, see discussion *supra*, political compromise in an effort to achieve that goal is not a permissible consideration under either the first or the second prong of *Karcher*. There simply can be no such thing as a consistently applied policy of *ad hoc* political compromise.

4. Communities of Interest

The defendants seek to justify variances in Districts 11 and 19, and perhaps others, by stating that the legislature was concerned with preserving certain interests. We note that the court in *Kirkpatrick* specifically found that the attempt to "avoid fragmenting areas with distinct economic and social interests, thereby diluting the effective representation of those interests in Congress" was an impermissible justification. *Kirkpatrick, supra*, p. 533.

The defendants have not even indicated to the Court what communities of interest they sought to preserve in Districts 11 and 19, much less what interests were being protected with respect to other districts. There has been no evidence presented that the deviations in any district's pop-

ulation was causally related to a policy of preservation of community interests. Even if defendants have strong state policy reasons to protect certain communities of interest, the defendants must still show that those policies could be effectuated only by permitting small variances and that, with respect to a certain type of interest, the policy was implemented and consistently applied throughout the state.

5. Other Legitimate Goals

The legitimate policy interests enumerated in *Karcher* include making districts compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the areas of prior districts, and avoiding contests between incumbent Representatives. In discussing secondary goals in this opinion, we do not intend to imply that no other secondary goals are available to a state to justify small variances. Once again, however, it should be emphasized that if asserted, legitimate policy interests must be proved by the state in accordance with the standard set forth above.

To summarize, we find that the defendants have not sustained "the burden of proving that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve some legitimate goal." *Karcher, supra*, p.

III

The primary thrust of *Karcher* is the Supreme Court's insistence that the "equal representation" standard of Article I, § 2 requires that congressional districts be apportioned to achieve population equality as nearly as is practicable. We have concluded that with a good faith effort the Ohio General Assembly practicably could have significantly reduced both the average variations from the ideal as well as the total percentage deviation. We reject a standard to determine primary good faith requiring a judicial attempt

to hone in on the subjective mentality of a bicameral multi-member legislative authority. What the body did, rather than what certain of its leaders said that they were trying to do, is a far more appropriate and realistic inquiry in this matter. It is rather obvious, in this case, that well-intentioned but secondary considerations significantly account for the nature and extent of the variances.

In the first instance a state cannot account for deviations from the ideal district by factoring in well-meant secondary goal considerations, and then argue that plaintiffs have failed to show a lack of good faith in getting as close as practicable to the ideal number. If this were the case, a state would never shoulder the burden of justifying significant variances resulting from the implementation of secondary goals. *Karcher* holds otherwise. Stated another way, if variances were avoidable, implementation of secondary goals cannot make them unavoidable. Moreover, while the New Jersey secondary goals were arguably different from the Ohio goals, in New Jersey, as in this case, the state failed to bear the burden of proving that each significant variance between districts was necessary to achieve the legitimate goals. Additionally, in both the New Jersey and Ohio Plans the secondary goals, which otherwise may have had the promise of legitimacy, fell short of the mark for the reason that the state failed to show that the goal or policy was consistently implemented state-wide. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Ohio Plan, like the New Jersey Plan, fails to meet the standard of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States.

IV

This Court is firm in its appreciation of the fact that congressional redistricting is a duty of the Ohio General Assembly. Although *Karcher* is to a degree illuminating as to the requirements for constitutionality redistricting remains a very difficult undertaking for the legislature. Im-

portant political considerations are at stake. Nevertheless, it is our expectation that the General Assembly can, with dispatch, present to this Court a revised plan, which comports with the Constitution of the United States. Nothing in this opinion is meant to suggest that the present plan is not amenable to revision or that it is not possible to satisfy the *Karcher* and *Kirkpatrick* requirements by eliminating variances between districts in the present Ohio Plan.

If, and only if, the General Assembly cannot meet its obligation, will this Court be required to provide a plan.

Accordingly, defendants are ORDERED to present the matter to the Ohio General Assembly for its consideration and preparation of a revised plan for congressional redistricting which satisfies the requirements of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution of the United States and other requirements of law. In the event that a plan is not forwarded to this Court for analysis and consideration within 45 days of the date of this order, further action will be taken by the Court.

Nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting the General Assembly from extending the February 23 deadline for filing petitions of candidacy for Congress.